c64bbd4466
Given that we are no longer inspecting the target of the /proc/self/exe symlink, stop asserting that it has any properties. Remove the plumbing for wrappersDir, which is no longer used. Asserting that the binary is located in the specific place is no longer necessary, because we don't rely on that location being writable only by privileged entities (we used to rely on that when assuming that readlink(/proc/self/exe) will continue to point at us and when assuming that the `.real` file can be trusted). Assertions about lack of write bits on the file were IMO meaningless since inception: ignoring the Linux's refusal to honor S[UG]ID bits on files-writeable-by-others, if someone could have modified the wrapper in a way that preserved the capability or S?ID bits, they could just remove this check. Assertions about effective UID were IMO just harmful: if we were executed without elevation, the caller would expect the result that would cause in a wrapperless distro: the targets gets executed without elevation. Due to lack of elevation, that cannot be used to abuse privileges that the elevation would give. This change partially fixes #98863 for S[UG]ID wrappers. The issue for capability wrappers remains. |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| config | ||
| hardware | ||
| i18n/input-method | ||
| image | ||
| installer | ||
| misc | ||
| profiles | ||
| programs | ||
| security | ||
| services | ||
| system | ||
| tasks | ||
| testing | ||
| virtualisation | ||
| module-list.nix | ||
| rename.nix | ||