A module for security options that are too small to warrant their own module. The impetus for adding this module is to make it more convenient to override the behavior of the hardened profile wrt user namespaces. Without a dedicated option for user namespaces, the user needs to 1) know which sysctl knob controls userns 2) know how large a value the sysctl knob needs to allow e.g., Nix sandbox builds to work In the future, other mitigations currently enabled by the hardened profile may be promoted to options in this module.
40 lines
1.3 KiB
Nix
40 lines
1.3 KiB
Nix
{ config, lib, ... }:
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with lib;
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{
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meta = {
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maintainers = [ maintainers.joachifm ];
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};
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options = {
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security.allowUserNamespaces = mkOption {
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type = types.bool;
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default = true;
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description = ''
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Whether to allow creation of user namespaces. A recurring problem
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with user namespaces is the presence of code paths where the kernel's
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permission checking logic fails to account for namespacing, instead
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permitting a namespaced process to act outside the namespace with the
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same privileges as it would have inside it. This is particularly
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damaging in the common case of running as root within the namespace.
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When user namespace creation is disallowed, attempting to create
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a user namespace fails with "no space left on device" (ENOSPC).
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'';
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};
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};
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config = mkIf (!config.security.allowUserNamespaces) {
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# Setting the number of allowed user namespaces to 0 effectively disables
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# the feature at runtime. Note that root may raise the limit again
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# at any time.
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boot.kernel.sysctl."user.max_user_namespaces" = 0;
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assertions = [
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{ assertion = config.nix.useSandbox -> config.security.allowUserNamespaces;
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message = "`nix.useSandbox = true` conflicts with `!security.allowUserNamespaces`.";
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}
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];
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};
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}
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