Slavi Pantaleev 316d653d3e Drop capabilities in containers ... We run containers as a non-root user (no effective capabilities). Still, if a setuid binary is available in a container image, it could potentially be used to give the user the default capabilities that the container was started with. For Docker, the default set currently is: - "CAP_CHOWN" - "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE" - "CAP_FSETID" - "CAP_FOWNER" - "CAP_MKNOD" - "CAP_NET_RAW" - "CAP_SETGID" - "CAP_SETUID" - "CAP_SETFCAP" - "CAP_SETPCAP" - "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE" - "CAP_SYS_CHROOT" - "CAP_KILL" - "CAP_AUDIT_WRITE" We'd rather prevent such a potential escalation by dropping ALL capabilities. The problem is nicely explained here: https://github.com/projectatomic/atomic-site/issues/203		2019-01-28 11:22:54 +02:00
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systemd	Drop capabilities in containers	2019-01-28 11:22:54 +02:00
usr-local-bin	Indent (non-YAML) using tabs	2019-01-26 09:37:29 +02:00
env-synapse.j2	Split playbook into multiple roles	2019-01-12 18:01:10 +02:00
homeserver.yaml.j2	Make roles more independent of one another	2019-01-16 18:05:48 +02:00
synapse.log.config.j2	Split playbook into multiple roles	2019-01-12 18:01:10 +02:00